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Abstract
This paper investigates a ﬁrm’s choice of timing and amount of self-protective in-
vestment when the arrival time of failure in its operations is not completely known.
We simulate our model to ﬁnd the eﬀects of the cost of investment incurred by the
ﬁrm as well as the ﬁrm’s beliefs, about the unknown time of failure, represented
by a Weibull distribution.
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1 Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to investigate a ﬁrm’s choice of timing
and amount of self-protective investment when the arrival time of failure in
its operations is not completely known. We deﬁne self-protective investment
in this paper (or self protection in short) as the type of investment that re-
duces the probability of failure. We give two examples in order to motivate
our study. First, consider a situation where machine used by a ﬁrm is subject
to breakdown and the ﬁrm incurs losses in case of failure. As a remedy the
ﬁrm applies preventive maintenance, the amount of which is important as it
negatively aﬀects the probability of failure. Our second example is related
to a ﬁrm subject to attack on a digital asset. Although attack is believed
to occur with certainty in the future, its exact timing is unknown. In order
to reduce the risk of attack the ﬁrm makes one-time IT security investment,
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1which may include the use or development of ﬁrewalls, anti spyware technolo-
gies, intrusion detection systems etc. The amount of IT security investment
matters since more investment helps the ﬁrm to protect itself better from
attack. In these two examples, imminent investment in self protection may
not be optimal as the probability of failure is low at the very beginning. On
the other hand, the system may fail before self-protective investment is made
if it is scheduled at a later time. Thus, the timing of the self protection is
critical.
In our paper, we consider an inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrm facing the complete
certainty of having an instantly harmful failure at some future unknown
date. The beliefs of the ﬁrm about the distribution of the failure time is
represented by a two-parameter Weibull distribution. The ﬁrm is able to
reduce the likelihood of the inevitable failure through a costly investment.
Thereby, the expected lifetime utility of the ﬁrm depends on its choice of the
timing as well as the amount of the self-protective investment.
After formulating the choice problem of the ﬁrm we simulate our model,
since the closed-form solutions for the optimal timing and amount of self-
protective investment are not available. Our comparative statics results es-
tablish that as the loss caused by the failure increases or as the ﬁrm becomes
more patient (less myopic), the amount of investment and the expected life-
time cost both increase while the optimal time to invest comes sooner. Sim-
ilar eﬀects on the optimal timing and amount of self-protective investment
are also obtained in response to an increase in the scaling parameter of the
Weibull distribution. Our simulations also show that as the shape parameter
of the failure distribution increases, the optimal time to invest comes sooner
and the optimal amount of investment becomes smaller.
Our model in this paper can be related to two streams of research. The
ﬁrst stream is the risk analysis literature, involving Ehrlich and Becker (1972)
and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) as two seminal papers, which cover both
self protection and insurance. Voluminous studies in this literature have
examined the implications of relaxing the key assumptions of these pioneering
works regarding risk level, risk aversion, wealth, and loss amount (see Dionne
and Harrington 1992 for a review). Remarkably, models in this literature
assume that the time of failure is completely known and self protection is
always made before the failure occurs. In this regard, they commonly ignore
situations where failure arises unexpectedly. Therefore, these models fail to
explain the fact that in reality ﬁrms do not always invest in self-protective
investment immediately after they have learnt that they would be subject
2to risk. Unlike this ﬁrst line of research, we model time of failure to be
random in our paper. However, failure probability can yet be controlled with
self-protective investment as before in the previous studies. For this reason,
timing and amount of self protection both become a choice variable in our
model.
The second stream of research is related to optimal control theoretic mod-
els. In this literature, Kamien and Schwartz (1971) deal with the problem
of determining the optimal preventive maintenance when it decreases the
hazard rate. Combining Ehrlich and Becker’s (1972) self protection and in-
surance model with the Yaari’s (1965) life cycle consumption and bequest
choices model, Ehrlich (2000) analyzes an individual’s demand for self pro-
tection against mortality and morbidity risk over her lifetime. Our model is
diﬀerent from these papers at least in two aspects. First, we assume that self-
protective investment reduces the likelihood of having faced a failure rather
than the value of the failure (hazard) rate at each point in time. Second,
we assume one-time self-protective investment whereas these models assume
continuous-time investment.1
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model, and Section 3 presents our results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider an inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrm operating over the time horizon [0,∞).
The ﬁrm faces the complete certainty of having a failure in (attack to) its
operations at some future random point during its lifetime. However, the
ﬁrm is able to reduce the probability of the occurance of this failure by any
point in time through a costly investment. We denote both the level and the
cost of the investment for self protection by z, which is to be determined by
the ﬁrm. On the other hand, the loss incurred by the ﬁrm right after the
failure is denoted by L > 0, which is given for the ﬁrm.
Before any investment for self protection is made, the probability that the
ﬁrm faces a failure by time t ≥ 0 is denoted by the probability distribution
function FB(t). We assume that before-investment probability distribution
FB(t) is a two-parameter Weibull distribution, often used in the reliability
engineering and failure analysis:
1However, we would like to note that our model can also be extended to a case in which
self protective investment occurs at multiple time points or continuously.
3FB(t) =
￿
1 − e−(t/λ)k if t ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(1)
where k > 0 is the shape parameter and λ > 0 is the scale parameter of







if t ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
(2)







λ)k−1 if t ≥ 0
0 otherwise. (3)
Here, the magnitude of the parameter k determines whether the failure rate
is decreasing (k < 1), constant (k = 1), or increasing (k > 1) over time.
After an investment of z for self protection is made at time T, the (un-
conditional) probability that the ﬁrm will face a failure by time t ≥ T is
denoted by the probability distribution function
FA(t;z) = FB(t)e
−z/t. (4)
It is apparent that FA(t;0) = FB(t), ∂FA(t;z)/∂z < 0, ∂2FA(t;z)/∂z2 > 0,
and FA(t;∞) = 0 for all t ≥ T. That is to say, the higher the investment, the
lower the probability of failure in every time interval. Besides, the marginal
eﬀect of the investment on the probability of failure is increasing. Moreover,
complete eliminitation of the risk of failure in any time interval is possible,
albeit inﬁnitely costly.
We denote the probability density functions associated with FB(t) and
FA(t;z) by fB(t) and fA(t;z) respectively. Clearly, fB(t) = ∂FA(t;z)/∂t and
fA(t;z) = fB(t)e−z/t + FB(t)(z/t2)e−z/t.
We ﬁnally assume that the ﬁrm continuously discount time at the rate
r > 0.
Now, we are ready to write the expected lifetime cost C(T,z) of the ﬁrm
calculated at time t = 0 if it plans to make, for self protection, an investment

















The ﬁrst integral term in the above expression is the expected loss of the ﬁrm
before it makes the investment at time T. The probability that the ﬁrm faces
no failure before time T is [1 − FB(T)]. We multiply this probability by the
expected net cost incurred by the ﬁrm from time T on. More precisely, the
ﬁrst term inside the big parenthesis is the expected loss due to failure after
the investment has been undertaken whereas the second term is the present
value of the cost of the investment.
The problem of the ﬁrm is to minimize its expected lifetime cost C(T,z)












and correspondingly the minimum expected lifetime cost C(T ∗,z∗(T)).
3 Results
Since general analytical solution of the above problem is not available, we
simulate the model for an artiﬁcial environment. The model involves 4 pa-
rameters, (L,r,k,λ), each of which commonly admits 7 distinct values in the
set {0.50,0.75,1.00,1.25,1.50,1.75,2.00}.
For our simulations, we put a limit on both the life time of the ﬁrm
and the amount of investment, which are unconstrained in the model. We
restrict the variable z to the grids {0,0.1,0.2,...,2.0} (as we must have z ≤ L
by optimality) and the variable T to {0,0.1,0.2,...,40.0}. These grids are
chosen to ensure that maxT,k,λ FB(T) ≥ 0.975 and minz maxT,k,λ FA(T,z) ≥
0.975. We also check after simulations that the optimizing values of T and z
always fall in the interior of their assumed domains.
Simulations are run using the MATLAB (version 7.4). The simulation
data can be reported in a spreadsheet involving 74 = 2401 data rows. (The
program codes and the simulated data are available from the authors upon re-
quest.) Each data row contains a distinct value for the parameters (L,r,k,λ),
5along with three generated output variables, (T∗,Z∗(T∗),C(T ∗,Z∗(T∗)). Sort-
ing the data spreadsheet with respect to each of the four model parameters,
we construct four distinct data matrices for our comparative statics. In each
of these matrices, we have 73 = 343 distinct observations for output variables
for each value of the model parameter that the particular data matrix corre-
sponds to. By averaging these 343 observations for each of the three output
variables, we obtain a comparative statics matrix consisting of seven rows
and four columns (involving an input column and three output columns) for
each model parameter.
Figures 1-2 exhibit our comparative static results with respect to the loss
parameter L. We observe that as L increases the amount of investment and
the expected lifetime cost both increase, while the optimal time to invest
comes sooner.
Figure 1 Figure 2
To get the intuition underlying the above ﬁndings, we ﬁrst note that the



















Investment in self protection, z, thus seems to have two separate eﬀects on
the expected lifetime cost of the ﬁrm: an indirect and cost-reducing eﬀect (at
6an interior solution) coming from the term
￿ ∞
T [fA(t,z)/(1 − FA(T,z))]e−rtdt
througha possible reductioninthe hazard rate and a direct andcost-enhancing
eﬀect through the term (z/L)e−rT arising from the implemention cost of the
investment. With an increase in the loss term L, the direct eﬀect of the
investment on cost becomes smaller, while the indirect eﬀect on cost remains
unchanged. Hence, it becomes optimal to increase z in response to a rise
in L. However, the optimal reaction of the self-protective investment to a
change in the loss parameter can have no eﬀect on the ﬁrst integral term in
(5), namely, L
￿ T
0 fB(t)e−rtdt, the expected loss of the ﬁrm before it makes
the investment at time T. Then, one can argue that in order to reduce the
share of the said expected pre-investment cost in its expected lifetime cost,
the ﬁrm can do nothing but carry out the investment earlier. Although the
ﬁrm optimally chooses the level and timing of investment to alleviate its ex-
pected lifetime cost, the optimal cost inevitably increases in response to a
rise in L, as naturally expected.
Figure 3 Figure 4
Figures 3-4 summarize our comparative static results with respect to the
discount rate r. As the parameter r becomes higher and the ﬁrm thus be-
comes more myopic, the optimal time to invest comes later whereas the
amount of investment as well as the expected lifetime cost of the ﬁrm fall, as
also evident from (5).
We depict in Figures 5 and 6 our comparative static results with respect to
the Weibulll scale parameter λ. We ﬁnd that as the distribution is scaled by
higher values of λ, the optimal time to invest comes later while the expected
7lifetime cost of the ﬁrm becomes smaller. In simulations, the optimal amount
of investment is found to be decreasing on average, after an initial temporary
rise, which we can attribute to the inadequacy of the size of grids to which the
variable z is restricted in our simulations. All of these results are in complete
accordance with the fact that with increased values of the parameter λ, the
probability that the ﬁrm will have faced an attack becomes reduced at almost
all time points before and after the investment has been realized (as evident
from FB(t) and FA(t,z)). The resulting decrease in the expected lifetime cost
stemming entirely from the presence of less riskier probability distributions
induces the ﬁrm not only to allocate less resources on the self-protective
investment but also to delay it to a more distant future that is weighed less
in the calculation of its lifetime welfare.
Figure 5 Figure 6
Finally, in Figures 7-8 we exhibit our comparative static results with
respect to the Weibull parameter k. We observe that as k increases, the op-
timal time to invest comes sooner while the amount of investment increases.
Surely, these observations are supporting the analytical fact that the higher
the parameter k, the lower (the higher) the probability that the ﬁrm will
have faced an attack at almost all time points preceding (exceeding) λ, as
one can see from (1) and (4). Although counterintuitive at a ﬁrst glance,
our simulations also show that the expected lifetime cost of the ﬁrm falls as
k increases despite the increase in the optimal amount of investment. The
reason is that the downward shift in the part of the probability distribution
curve lying over the time interval [0,λ], due to an increase in k, is so extreme
8that the resulting decrease in the expected pre-investment cost of the ﬁrm
- the ﬁrst integral term in the cost function (5) - absolutely outweighs the
increase in its expected post-investment cost.
Figure 7 Figure 8
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have modeled the problem of a ﬁrm optimally choosing the
timing and amount of self protective investment in the face of a failure that
is believed to occur with certainty at an unknown point in time. We have
simulated our model and established that as the ﬁrm becomes less myopic
or the instant loss due to failure becomes higher, the amount of investment
and the expected lifetime cost both become higher, while the optimal time to
invest comes sooner. We have obtained similar results in response to a rise in
the scaling parameter of the two-parameter Weibull distribution representing
the ﬁrm’s beliefs about the failure time. Finally, we have showed that a rise
in the shape parameter of the failure distribution leads to a speedening of the
optimal time to invest while a reduction in the optimal amount of investment.
We believe that our model in this paper can be extended in several ways.
In our current model we assume that self-protective investment is made only
once. However, we can modify it so that investment can instead be made at
multiple time points (or continuously). Such an extension can be solved by
dynamic programming via backwards induction (or by optimal control) as the
9level of the current self-protective investment will aﬀect its future level. One
can predict that this intertemporal aspect of the extended problem would
optimally require investment smoothing on the part of the ﬁrm, which is
expected to make its ﬁrst investment earlier and in a smaller amount.
Another possible extension is to incorporate insurance into our model.
In this regard, one can consider a model in which either self-protective in-
vestment and insurance decisions are made simultaneously or the timing of
self-protective investment is earlier than that of insurance. As the ﬁrm should
be risk averse in order to take insurance, we argue that in the proposed ex-
tension the eﬀect of increasing or decreasing risk aversion on the level of
optimal investment can proﬁtably be studied as well.
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